Freedom of Thought as a Condition of Theoretical Cognition

Abstract

AbstractThis chapter considers the question: why, in Kant’s view, do our intellectual freedom and our theoretical rationality require that we can think without being determined by natural causes? Kant does not make the blanket claim that causal determinism per se is incompatible with epistemic freedom and rational thinking. Rather, Kant argues that if the human mind were exclusively determined by empirical causes (or indeed by any foreign causes, including also divine imposition), then our cognitive representations would lack a priori rational necessity. This would fatally undermine all our cognitive efforts including those that aim to reach objectively valid empirical judgments, because these judgments depend for their cognitive validity on a priori representations such as causal necessity. The chapter examines how Kant’s views on epistemic freedom relate to Hume, to his transcendental idealism, and to contemporary views on causation and evolutionary theory. It further shows how Kant can defend his view against various objections such as the genetic fallacy charge already considered in Chapter IV. The chapter culminates with the argument that we possess certain knowledge that our theoretical intellect is transcendentally free. However, from this it does not follow that our will or practical reason is also transcendentally free.