Freedom Is Not Academic

Abstract

The subject of freedom is fascinatingly complex. Academic freedom is a part of the general subject and shares its complexity. It may be defined theoretically as the right of the teacher to pursue the truth. It can be described actually as the scope the teacher possesses to study, teach, and say what he pleases so long as he remains within the limits allowed by the particular institution, state, or society in which he works. Academic freedom is not something which teachers provide for themselves, nor is it created by the universities, although universities sometimes place their own limits upon it. Academic freedom is a privilege granted teachers by the state. In this respect, there is no essential difference between public and private institutions. Where academic freedom is regarded as a right of free speech, it is, like all other legal rights, created by law. Where it is not regarded as a legal right, it exists by sufferance, by virtue of the absence of laws to the contrary. What the sovereign permits, it authorizes. Any relationship between academic freedom and world citizenship, either figurative or literal, is pretty nebulous. There is no world citizenship. If there were, it is not at all clear that it would or could provide for academic freedom in the sense in which it is practiced in American universities. Freedom to teach is created and sustained by the specific, identifiable community or nation in which the teaching is done. The degree of academic freedom permitted is determined by the purposes for which the community or the nation wants the teaching done. Academic freedom must be compatible with such purposes. An appreciation of this fact is of fundamental importance. It helps to make clear the origin, the present status, and the future hope of academic freedom. It tells us why a considerable degree of academic freedom exists in some societies, and little, if any, in others. The educational system of any nation, whether created and supported as a public system or permitted to exist as a private one, can be given only the degree of academic freedom which is compatible with the dominant sentiments, needs, and purposes of that particular society. If the dominant social or political ideas find academic freedom incompatible or dangerous, as in the case of Russia or Nazi Germany, such freedom will be restricted or adjusted accordingly. If, as in the United States, Great Britain, or France, it is believed that the prevailing sentiments or interests are not imperiled by academic freedom, a fairly wide degree of such freedom is allowed. Does this mean that if academic freedom were incompatible with or antagonistic to the dominant interests and sentiments of the United States, Great Britain, or France, academic freedom would be restricted accordingly? It does. Academic freedom exists only in those societies in which freedom in general is a matter of some national concern. If the dominant interests of a society become power or national security or even welfare, the freedom of the schools to teach will be tailored accord-