Freedom and women: A case for existential analysis

Abstract

The first thing to note about the interviews is that none of the women had a clear sense of the meaning of freedom. If freedom was not equated with narcissism, then it was seen as non-existent, and women would emphasize the determined particularity of their existences. The second thing to notice is that most women were blind to the need for self-reflection as a source of knowledge, the kind of reflection that science could not provide. Most looked for self-definition outside of themselves. Just as the empiricist Margaret Mead, who extruded her sense of self by referring to photographs, films, or books, so these women also tried to find their identity by observing reactions of their parents, spouses, lovers, children, counsellors, and so on. Since most women saw themselves as beings who were externally determined, these women were blind not only to their freedom but also to their responsibility for who they were. The third thing to note is that freedom in the sense of freedom from is experienced as painful. The terror of ruptured ties tends to blind people to the freedom they have to project possibilities and to become re-engaged. Usually, people find it easier to postulate a project which then allows them to re-assign significance to their behavior and surroundings so as to make certain aspects of their past unimportant. Any rupture goes almost unnoticed since the person's attention is positively focused toward a new possibility. The fourth thing of note is that life histories cannot be recorded, as these unfortunately were, categorized only chronologically. To record life histories we must be clear about the kind of knowledge they may reveal. It is my feeling that this knowledge may be gained through a process of understanding guided by an existential analysis For a theory toward understanding see Manda Cesara, (pseudonym for Karla O. Poewe) . (London and New York: Academic Press, 1982). . Finally, of even greater importance is the recognition that freedom itself is closely tied to understanding, as projection of possibilities and as interpretation, and it is tied to meaning. Indeed without understanding or meaning there can be no freedom. We may doubt that “situated freedom” or freedom through a “liberating presence” is truly freedom, but even here meaning (if also the evasion of pain) plays a major role. In the end, freedom consists of a dialectic between breaking with and participating in. Freedom is simultaneously freedom from and freedom toward. While most women recognized the pain that comes with freedom realized through rupture (as for example divorce), none of them recognized the pain that had to be overcome in order to become free with reference to the apparent inevitabilities of life (for example one's race, sex, death). It would appear, however, that religious conversion is a way of painlessly coming to terms with perceived imperatives. One runs the risk, however, of being seduced rather than freed, and of postulating determination where none may exist. In the end we can not escape that unpopular task among American women, namely, that of gaining self awareness and of assuming responsibility for who we are I thank the many students of the University of Lethbridge who had the courage to undertake research of a life history. While all enjoyed their project, I know that most were shocked by their findings. . And, as Sartre so well understood, this will continue to have its self-chosen political imperatives, also.