Freedom and Responsibility in Neoplatonist Thought by Ursula Coope

Abstract

Reviewed by: Freedom and Responsibility in Neoplatonist Thought by Ursula Coope Carl S. O'Brien Ursula Coope. Freedom and Responsibility in Neoplatonist Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. xii + 288. Cloth, $70.00. Ursula Coope's volume sets out to answer the question of why "true freedom" necessitates "freedom from bodies" according to the Neoplatonists. As a result, while the title suggests a work on ethics, the volume handles such questions within a broader metaphysical framework. Coope admirably traces the initially separate treatments of freedom and responsibility in earlier thinkers before examining how they merge into twin aspects of a related discussion. The handling of Plato's concept of freedom in the first chapter outlines a series of relevant issues, rather than evaluating their relative significance (17), since the primary focus is on the subsequent tradition. The title is somewhat misleading since much of the volume is concerned with the Neoplatonic background, rather than with Neoplatonism itself, with detailed treatment of both the Stoic Epictetus and the Peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias. However, this is essential for the development of Coope's thesis, which attributes a "perfectionist" concept of freedom (one linking freedom with moral progress) to Plotinus, similar to Epictetus and contrary to Alexander. This involves analyzing the extent to which actions depend upon us (45–52). Such Stoic-influenced elements are linked with those one might perhaps consider more typically Neoplatonic, such as the role of the Intellect in attaining virtue and freedom, since ignorance and emotional suffering represent obstacles to freedom (59). In its treatment of freedom and the One, chapter 5 also deals with an obviously Neoplatonic theme, reinforced by the discussion of the One's transcendent nature (73–75) and the difficulty of predicating anything of the One (77–92). Coope presents freedom then as a fundamental influence on Neoplatonic metaphysics, since everything under the One, in light of its dependence upon the One, cannot be free (94–95). The One's freedom is consequently part of the motivation for achieving mystical union with it. Viewed from this perspective, chapters 5 and 6 are essentially summaries of Plotinian metaphysics, but oriented toward the perspective of freedom and responsibility, intertwined with an explanation of why freedom should be considered valuable (96). The discussion of the soul's self-determination in the latter parts of chapter 6 (e.g. 103–6) forms a useful contribution to the focus on Plotinus and the self that is at the forefront of much recent scholarship. The relationship of the World Soul to the individual human soul is lent an interesting perspective by the combined framework of freedom and responsibility. The human soul's temporary nonbodiliness and consequent period in the intelligible world is a kind of freedom, although it also raises the question of freedom in the context of dependence upon a larger whole (146), while the degree to which our responsibility is potentially limited by Providence is also handled (151–59). These topics have been extensively and frequently treated before, but the orientation toward freedom and responsibility adds a certain freshness to the discussion here. For example, Coope considers the manner in which human souls can be regarded as a component of Providence and relates this to the whole-part discussion by representing Providence as "a kind of derivative unity" (157). Plotinus's interpretation of the myth of Er as the point at which the soul can be regarded as responsible for its current life serves as a springboard for consideration of the later tradition. In order to maintain our responsibility for our actions, Proclus presents [End Page 679] each soul's choice of life as a genuine one, even if this is placed under the control of Providence (178), but the extent to which the soul's failures are the result of its ignorance ensures that the ultimate degree of the soul's responsibility remains problematic. Chapter 10 examines why humans are held responsible for their actions while plants and animals are not; evidently, humans have the resources to become moral (due to the undescended intellectual part in Plotinus's system). This then segues into a treatment of some central questions of Neoplatonic metaphysics: the origin of evil...