Freedom and Praxis in Plotinus’s Ennead 6.8.1-6

Bernardo Portilho Andrade

doi:10.14195/1984-249x_30_31

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that Plotinus does not limit the sphere of free human agency simply to intellectual contemplation, but rather extends it all the way to human praxis. Plotinus’s goal in the first six chapters of Ennead 6.8 is, accordingly, to demarcate the space of freedom within human practical actions. He ultimately concludes that our external actions are free whenever they actualize, in unhindered fashion, the moral principles derived from intellectual contemplation. This raises the question of how the freedom of practical actions might relate to the freedom of intellectual contemplation. After considering two previously offered models – a model of double activity, and an Aristotelian model of practical syllogism – I offer a third alternative, namely a model of moral attunement, according to which our rational desires assume a kind of ‘care of the soul’ through active supervision. Practical life is thus imbued with freedom to the extent that the soul supervises its actions to conform to its will and choice of the good.

Highlights

Archai (ISSN: 1984-249X), n. 30, Brasília, 2020, e03031. This raises the question of how the freedom of practical actions might relate to the freedom of intellectual contemplation
Practical life is imbued with freedom to the extent that the soul supervises its actions to conform to its will and choice of the good
The challenge I face in this paper is to explain, how Plotinus assigns freedom both to inner intellectual contemplation and to outer, virtuous actions

Summary

Introduction

This raises the question of how the freedom of practical actions might relate to the freedom of intellectual contemplation. Free human activity resides both in inner intellectual contemplation and, simultaneously but derivatively, in the rational desires operative in outer virtuous actions.

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Results

Conclusion