Free Will without Metaphysics

Abstract

Free will is the ability to transform thoughts and desires into actions, and this ability to act freely is presumed to underlie people’s practice of moral praise and blame, as well society’s practice of legal punishment. However, many scholars believe that people’s concept of free will is hopelessly corrupted by metaphysical assumptions, such as a belief in the soul or a belief in magical causation. Scientific explanations of human behavior and the physical universe contradict such metaphysical assumptions. This raises the concern that science also invalidates the ordinary concept of free will and thereby unseats a key requisite for moral and legal responsibility. Such a concern, however, turns on the exact content of people’s concept of free will. Here we discuss a program of research that seeks to clarify the folk concept of free will and its role in moral judgment. We also examine possible challenges to the concept and their impact on moral judgment. Our data show that people have a psychological concept of free will—they assume that “free actions” are based on choices that fulfill one’s desires and are relatively free from internal and external constraints. Moreover, we argue that these components—choice, desires, and constraints—lie at the heart of people’s moral judgments. Once these components are accounted for, the abstract concept of free will contributes very little to people’s moral judgments, and challenges to the concept have little impact on those judgments.