Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Scientific Epiphenomenalism.

Alfred R Mele

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02536

Abstract

This article addresses two influential lines of argument for what might be termed “scientific epiphenomenalism” about conscious intentions – the thesis that neither conscious intentions nor their physical correlates are among the causes of bodily motions – and links this thesis to skepticism about free will and moral responsibility. One line of argument is based on Benjamin Libet’s neuroscientific work on free will. The other is based on a mixed bag of findings presented by social psychologist Daniel Wegner. It is argued that both lines of argument are unsuccessful.

Highlights

Brief attention to some key notions will prove useful
The best I can do here in response is to point such readers to my arguments elsewhere that the data do not support this proposition about participants in these studies (Mele, 2009, chs. 3, 4, and 6). It is sometimes claimed, based partly on Libet’s findings, that conscious intentions and decisions are caused by the same brain events that cause actions and are absent from the causal chain that issues in action (Wegner, 2002, pp. 64–70)
How does Wegner get from evidence of the kind I described to the conclusion that conscious proximal intentions and their physical correlates are never among the causes of corresponding actions? That is, how does he get from this evidence to scientific epiphenomenalism about conscious proximal intentions?

Summary

Introduction

Brief attention to some key notions will prove useful. I start with deciding. Wegner (2002, 2004, 2008) contends, as I have mentioned, that conscious intentions and decisions are never among the causes of corresponding actions. Participants in the studies at issue are asked to report on when they had certain conscious experiences – described variously as experiences of an urge, intention, or decision to do what they did.

Results

Conclusion