Free Will and Moral Responsibility

Abstract

1. We Ever Be Really, Truly, Ultimately, Free?: Mark Bernstein (Purdue University). 2. On an Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility: Randolph Clark (University of Georgia). 3. Deliberation and Metaphysical Freedom: E. J. Coffman (University of Notre Dame) and Ted A. Warfield (University of Notre Dame). 4. Alienation, Autonomy, and the Self: Laura Waddell Ekstrom (College of William and Mary). 5. Neurobiology, Neuroimaging, and Free Will: Walter Glannon (University of Calgary). 6. Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question: Steward Goetz (Ursinus College). 7. Freedom, Obligation, and Responsibility: Prospects for a Unifying Theory: Ishtiyaque Haji (University of Calgary). 8. Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives: David P. Hunt (Whittier College). 9. Decisions, Intentions, and Free Will: Alfred R. Mele (Florida State University). 10. Where Frankfurt and Strawson Meet: Michael McKenna (Ithaca College). 11. Freedom, Responsibility and the Challenge of Situationism: Dana K. Nelkin (University of California, San Diego). 12. Freedom with a Human Face: Timothy O'Connor (Indiana University). 13. Defending Hard Incompatibilism: Derk Pereboom (University of Vermont). 14. Free Will and Respect for Persons: Saul Smilansky (University of Haifa). 15. PAPistry: Another Defense: Daniel Speak (Azusa Pacific University). 16. The Trouble with Tracing: Manuel Vargas (University of San Francisco). 17. Blameworthiness, Non-robust Alternatives, and the Principle of Alternative Expectations: David Widerker (Bar Ilan University). 18. More on Ought Implies Can and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Gideon Yaffe (University of Southern California).