Abstract
AbstractWe compare the number of firms in equilibrium in a Cournot industry with positive network effects and complete compatibility, under free and second‐best entry. Under free entry, the firms decide whether to enter the market or not; in the second‐best problem, the number of firms is established by the regulator to maximize social welfare (the regulator controls entry but not production). We show that when individual equilibrium output decreases with entry (business‐stealing competition), free entry may lead to more or less firms than the second‐best problem. This contrasts with the standard (nonnetwork) Cournot oligopoly model, wherein with business‐stealing competition, free entry leads to an excessive number of firms compared with the second‐best solution.
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