Abstract
“In comparison with liberty and equality, the idea of fraternity has had a lesser place in democratic theory. It is thought to be less specifically a political concept, not in itself defining any of the democratic rights ... “(Rawls, 1971, p. 105). This observation, formulated by John Rawls in his A Theory of Justice, will occur to anyone who examines the Republican triad: political philosophy is very much concerned with liberty and equality, but considerably less so with fraternity.1 Always somewhat eclipsed by the other two values, fraternity has undergone neither the formal treatment initially generated by Berlin’s distinction between “positive” and “negative” liberty, nor the analytical effort to define the term similar to Williams’, Nagel’s, or Dworkin’s approach to equality.
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