Franco‐German bilateralism and agricultural politics in the European Union: The neglected level

Abstract

Most of the newer models of European Union (EU) politics and European integration downplay the role of national governments or at least see their influence as waning. This article takes issue with this thesis. It analyses the conflicts that took place over the creation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the early 1960s and over the reform of the CAP and the GATT Uruguay Round in the early 1990s. It presents an essentially intergovernmentalist explanation of these conflicts, arguing that their outcomes were determined by the stances taken by the French and German governments: if they supported a given project, it was approved; if they opposed it, it failed; if and as long as they were divided, the decision‐making process was deadlocked. On the one hand, it would be hazardous to generalise these findings to other EU issues and policy areas. On the other, the practice (and the impact) of Franco‐German bilateralism is far from being confined solely to ‘history‐making’ EU decisions. More research is warranted on this hitherto largely‐neglected level of EU politics.