France and the Quad Plus

Abstract

In France, the launch of the so-called “Quad Plus” in March 2020 raised little attention. The general impression was that this new grouping was quite heterogeneous and maybe not the most relevant to tackle the challenge it ambitioned to address: the COVID-19 crisis. The examination of France’s various engagements in the Indo-Pacific can provide some clues regarding the synergies or divergences with the “Quad Plus” initiative. In 2018, Paris unveiled its own Indo-Pacific strategy that reflects a strategic reassessment of its interests. At the same time, there is now a recognition that China’s rise is increasingly challenging French interests in the region. France can thus more adequately protect its sovereign interests while promoting and advancing its own vision for a balanced, multipolar, inclusive Indo-Pacific regional order, upheld by key liberal principles and multilateral schemes. The French Indo-Pacific vision relies on key strategic partnerships with all the members of the Quad. However, a concern to keep its strategic autonomy in the context of a worsening US–China rivalry and the strong interest to coordinate with European partners in the Indo-Pacific explain why Paris has been to join the “Quad Plus” in 2020. While Joe Biden’s election could facilitate a rapprochement between France and the Quad, Paris will certainly continue to give priority to flexible, ad hoc, issue-based coalitions in which it would maintain its autonomy, alongside a deepening of the bilateral relations with the members of the Quad Plus.