France and the German Economy 1945–48

Abstract

Was it France’s intention at the end of the Second World War to become he Old Continent’s leading economic power? In other words, did France take advantage of Germany’s defeat by appropriating its economic assets and turning the European industrial balance in its favor? For over thirty years this question has featured in the historiography of Franco-German economic relations, as historians have long considered France’s post-1945 policy toward Germany to be imperialist. According to the majority of these historians, the sole purpose of French plans for political and economic detachment of the Ruhr and Rhineland was to weaken Germany and at the same time strengthen its own economic potential. By detaching the Ruhr, France would gain control of the bulk of German coal and steel reserves—the very fundament of economic and military power at the time. But since the mid-1980s this theory has lost ground. Instead, argue modern historians, it was rather the imperatives of security and reparations that shaped French policy toward Germany, and detachment of the Ruhr was the only means whereby France could reconcile these two conflicting objectives.1 If the detachment of the Rhineland is to be interpreted as an imperialist act, then it was driven out of political and militaristic need rather than economic greed, as can be explained by the creation of a buffer zone—a by-product of detachment—protecting France from Germany.2