Framing hate: Moral foundations, party cues, and (in)tolerance of offensive speech

Grant M Armstrong,Julie Wronski

doi:10.5964/jspp.v7i2.1006

Abstract

One of the most controversial elements of political tolerance concerns support for hate speech. We argue that there are two factors that can reduce tolerance for hate speech: 1) moral foundations and 2) party cues. U.S. citizens’ tolerance of hate speech will be reduced when it is framed as a violation of a specific moral foundation, opposed by a political party, or when the morality violation is utilized by party elites. Using two survey experiments, we manipulated the target of hate speech (i.e. Muslims or the American flag), whether the speech violated a moral foundation (i.e. harm or loyalty), and which political party supported or opposed the hate speech in question. For flag burning, moral frames and party cues on their own reduced U.S. citizens’ tolerance relative to a non-political control, while moral frames and party cues were successful in reducing tolerance of anti-Muslim speech compared to a free speech appeal. Partisans were generally responsive to cues from the in-party. We also found instances of moral repackaging, where morally incongruent appeals from the in-party reduced tolerance of flag burning among Democrats. Among Republicans, harm morality decreased tolerance of anti-Muslim speech when invoked by the in-party, but increased tolerance when used by the out-party – an indication of the power of party cues to repackage moral arguments and to trigger backlash. These results provide a better understanding of what factors can affect tolerance for hate speech, providing political leaders and social justice advocates with a roadmap to alleviate this problem.

Highlights

One of the foundational components of a democratic society is political tolerance
Partisans were responsive to cues from the in-party, and occasionally exhibited decreased tolerance towards hate speech when it was presented as a moral frame violation that resonated with their party's values (i.e. Democrats and harm; Republicans and loyalty)
We examine how moral frames and party cues affect tolerance for two distinct instances of hate speech: 1) U.S flag burning, which likely should be deemed more offensive by Republicans who hold national loyalty moral values (Graham & Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007), and 2) anti-Muslim Muhammad cartoon drawings, which likely should be considered more offensive by Democrats who wish to protect minority groups from harm (Ditto & Koleva, 2011; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Koleva et al, 2012)

Summary

Introduction

One of the foundational components of a democratic society is political tolerance. We seek to identify methods of reducing tolerance towards harmful speech within the American political context, in an effort to address this threat to social justice. We identify two frames through which public tolerance for hate speech can be diminished 1) Moral Foundations Theory, and 2) Partisan Cue-Taking. The specific methods by which moral foundations and partisan cues can shape tolerance of hate speech are unclear. Can party cues and moral frames reduce tolerance for hate speech in isolation, or do they work in tandem? Is moral reframing capable of reducing tolerance for hate speech? Are cues from the in-party ubiquitously successful in reducing tolerance of hate speech, even when they Can party cues and moral frames reduce tolerance for hate speech in isolation, or do they work in tandem? Is moral reframing capable of reducing tolerance for hate speech? Are cues from the in-party ubiquitously successful in reducing tolerance of hate speech, even when they

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Conclusion