Framework of Strategic Management Model for Strategy Europe 2020: Diachronic Analysis and Proposed Guidelines

The EU Response to COVID-19: From Reactive Policies to Strategic Decision-Making.

A new partnership between science and politics. European scientists ought to adapt to new research policy paradigms.

Disharmonization in the Regulation of Transgenic Plants in Europe

From the very beginning, the Eurozone was conceived as a new brand of economic governance institutions: a single currency, with a single, independent central bank conducting monetary policy according to a simple — and almost single — objective of price stability; and decentralized fiscal policies, in the hands of national governments of member states, with simple fiscal rules — the Stability and Growth Pact — and a minimal , rather informal, coordination institution : the Eurogroup. Alongside the objective of monetary stability, the ambition was to foster further economic integration, convergence in living standards amongst member states and sustained growth. Indeed, the "Lisbon strategy" adopted by the European Council in March 2000, a little more than one year after the launching of European Monetary Union, bravely stated that the objective was to make the EU "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion" by 2010. The successor strategy, adopted in 2010 — "Europe 2020" — posted similar, yet less precise objectives of "smart and inclusive growth." In the minds of its founding fathers, the Eurozone was to be the spearhead of this leap forward in economic and social performance; launched with 11 of the then 15 member states, it would act as a shield from the rest of the world instability and disturbances and would eventually become so successful as to attract all EU member states, including those (Denmark and the UK) that had willingly opted out from the beginning, and those (Central and Eastern European Countries) that would join the EU a few years later.

Editorial: Governing the EU's climate and energy transition through the 2030 Framework

In March 2000, the heads of the European Union countries proclaimed the aim of making Europe the “most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustaining economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” by 2010. To achieve this overall goal, a set of economic and social reforms called the “Lisbon Strategy” or the “Lisbon Agenda” to be undertaken was defined. Several objectives, grouped in five dimensions (employment, innovation and research, structural economic reforms, social cohesion, environment) were set up. It was agreed upon that the European Commission should annually prepare progress reports in order to evaluate the progress the Member States have made in achieving the Lisbon goals. In its mid-term review in 2005, the European Commission concluded that the implementation of reforms in line with the Lisbon Strategy had in many areas been too slow. In particular, the growth performance of the past five years had been disappointing, particularly as compared to other regions of the world economy such as the US and certain Asian economies. Therefore, the Lisbon Strategy was revised, focussing on growth and the creation of employment (European Commission, 2005 and 2006).KeywordsTotal Factor ProductivityEuro AreaTotal Factor Productivity GrowthLabour Market RegulationLabour Market InstitutionThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Blinded peer assessment of surgical skill is feasible and can predict complication rates: a step toward measuring surgical quality.

Protection of constitutional identity in light of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Poland – a comparative study

In March 2000, the Lisbon European Council agreed upon a new strategic goal for the European Union: to become the “most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.” One decade and the sobering experience of a global economic crisis later, the European Commission's new 2020 Strategy sets out a vision of Europe's social market economy for the 21st century that “shows how the EU can emerge stronger from the economic crisis and how it can be turned into a smart, sustainable and inclusive economy delivering high levels of employment, productivity and social cohesion.” If somewhat more modest in its targets, Europe 2020 reiterates the guiding ambition to enhance the EU's economic performance in the internal and global market that already dominated the Lisbon strategy. The lesson learned from Europe's “lost decade” is that the EU needs to replace the “slow and largely uncoordinated pace of reforms” with a “sustainable recovery” in order to regain its competitiveness, boost its productivity, and put it on “an upward path of prosperity.” This is, then, the EU's first “Lisbon” agenda that heavily relies on the internal market and that depicts social inclusion and political stability as conditioned upon further European economic integration. The recipe to defy what has grown from a “merely” economic crisis into a social and political crisis of the Union and its Member States is a combination of “smart,” “sustainable,” and “inclusive” growth.

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I n March 2000, European heads of governments and of states agreed in Lisbon that by 2010, the European Union (EU) should become “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.”[*][1] To implement this objective, they agreed in Barcelona in 2002 to devote 3% of their gross domestic product (GDP) in 2010 to R&D and to foster common science policies in a “European Research Area,” as proposed by EU research commissioner Philippe Busquin. To meet these ambitious goals, the EU countries need to move beyond rhetoric and commit to substantial increases in their R&D spending. Several reports released in 2003 by the European Commission (the political and administrative arm of the EU) indicate that the EU countries invest much less in research than the United States or Japan (1.9% of GDP, compared with 2.8% for the United States and 3.0% for Japan in 2000).[†][2] Furthermore, although the EU countries produce the highest number of science graduates and postgraduates (2.14 million graduates in 2000, compared with 2.07 million in the United States) and publish more scientific papers (37% of global scientific papers, compared with 31% for the United States and 10% for Japan), they employ fewer researchers than the United States or Japan (5.4 researchers per 1000 workers, compared with 8.7 in the United States and 9.7 in Japan). In a recent action plan,[‡][3] the European Commission sets out how the EU can bridge the growing gap in research investment between Europe and the United States. According to the plan, a research investment of 3% of GDP would result in ∼0.5% of additional growth and 400,000 additional jobs every year after 2010. To reach this level of investment, the European research effort will have to grow by 8% per year; business funding for R&D will have to increase more (9%) than public funding (6%), because it lags far behind in most countries. Given the present trend in public budgets in Europe, these targets are very ambitious. To facilitate the 8% growth and better integrate and coordinate research activities, the EU aims to create a European Research Area, which would increase the efficiency and competitiveness of European research by avoiding dispersion of funding on subcritical programs. By pooling national and EU resources—such as those of the present Framework Program for R&D (3.5 billion euros per year)—the European Research Area could fund joint research programs, build and operate common research facilities (such as new x-ray sources), and promote the mobility of researchers across Europe. Furthermore, the creation of a European Research Council has been proposed by European scientists and is supported by heads of research organizations and the European Science Foundation.[§][4] The council would encompass all disciplines and complement national agencies and the Framework Program. It would, for example, provide grants and fellowships for individual researchers and groups, thereby facilitating better use of European research facilities. In the long term, the council could establish leading-edge research centers. Governments await a report on this proposal from a panel of science policy-makers chaired by Federico Mayor, former director general of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and aim to make a decision in 2004. Additional funding is needed to meet these objectives and to support projects from young scientists. This can only be achieved if scientists apply strong pressure on EU governments. A complication, and a challenge, arises from the fact that at least 10 new countries will soon join the EU. Most of these countries have an old scientific tradition, but their scientific infrastructures must be renewed. Furthermore, public spending in EU countries is under severe constraints, because budget deficits must not exceed 3% of GDP. Governments and the European Commission have recently suggested that public investments for research and defense should be excluded from this 3% limit. Increased R&D is crucial for the future economic and social well-being of Europe. The commitment to increased public and private investment in research should be implemented soon by all EU countries. Several countries, including Sweden and Finland, have already met the Barcelona objective, but others are far from reaching it. This year, France even reduced public support for research and recruitment of researchers. We also have to move beyond rhetoric to implement the European Research Area. The draft European constitution defines research and technological development as a shared prerogative between individual countries and the EU. This is a positive step, but all these ambitious objectives require a strong political will, which has yet to be demonstrated by governments all over Europe. [1]: #fn-1 [2]: #fn-2 [3]: #fn-3 [4]: #fn-4

THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY Since a few years, the European Union (EU) has taken several initiatives to promote and protect innovation. According to the European Commission, innovation is the prerequisite for the competitiveness of the European industries and businesses and, furthermore, for growth and employment. Thus, innovation has been given a central place in the Lisbon strategy which influences national and European policies and actions. In this context, intellectual property rights (IPRs) enforcement has become a priority in fighting counterfeiting and piracy which have increased in a worrisome way. The achievement of the single market is the first legal basis to organize a uniform system of IPRs by creating titles that coexist with national ones. But, in the context of globalization, the EU does also deal with external trade policy as part of the external aspects of the Lisbon strategy. The interface between external trade and IPRs appeared in 1986 in the framework of the Uruguay Round. But, at that time, the European Community had no competence on this subject. The Amsterdam and Nice treaties tried to give it the competence in the commercial aspects of intellectual property. Such initiative resulted in a lack of visibility, as its competence was shared with the Member States. As the Lisbon treaty has clarified its competences, the European Union has now an exclusive competence in the commercial aspects of intellectual property and the Council can act by a qualified majority to conclude agreements on this subject. Without waiting the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, the European Commission has decided that IPRs were one of the new growth sectors that the EU would include in the foundations of its common commercial policy. The EU maintains its commitment to multilateralism and is involved in the Doha Round which tries to improve the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement in line with development priorities. In that context, the UE has a unique status of full member next to its member states and tries to get a better protection of geographical indications. But, as the negotiations face strong oppositions between the parties on the agricultural subject, the European Commission has decided, through free trade agreements (FTAs) to get stronger and stricter provisions on IPRs. By concluding FTAs, the EU seeks to obtain extended engagements than in the multilateral context. This is also a way for the UE to export its own standards of IPRs protection. Bilateralism is considered a complement to multilateralism and the European Commission wants to use the same tools as its “competitors”, such as the United States. On the basis of several criterias, it has identified countries which could become its trading partners through FTAs. The study of the recent agreements between the EU and the Cariforum group and with South Korea reveal deeper engagements from the EU’s trading partners to provide an IP protection similar to the one in the EU. Furthermore, since 2007, negotiations are engaged with ASEAN and India which have qualified as priorities for the conclusion of new generations of FTAs. The European Commission seems to be all the more determined to improve through bilateral cooperation the enforcement of IPRs as the “Europe 2020” strategy maintains the priority on innovation and the end of the Doha Round is not predictable in a middle term. But this position may not be conformed to the EU’s international objectives.

One of Europe’s major weaknesses lies in its inferiority in terms of transforming the results of technological research and skills into innovations and competitive advantages (European Commission, 1995, p. 8). Technology transfer is a key aspect of economic development and research administration. These concerns are shared equally between academia and industry on both sides of the Atlantic. As technology is developed at a greater rate, concerns about the technology transfer will heighten. This article focuses on technology transfer in Ireland, particularly in the SME (Small and Medium size Enterprises, under 250 employees) sector. As the main Lisbon Objective has not been met in Europe (“Europe is to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”), the authors suggest a better model of technology transfer applicable not only to Ireland and Europe, but with possibilities for the United States. Demonstrating the international dimensions of technology transfer, the article also provides an American perspective, demonstrating commonality of interest yet subtle differences. Research Management Review, Volume 15, Number 1 Winter/Spring 2006 2 THE EUROPEAN UNION’S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE FOR INNOVATION Since the publication of the European Commission’s Green Paper on Innovation, there has been general acknowledgment of the need to address the European Paradox, as outlined in Figure 1, in which EU scientific performance, as measured by number of scientific publications, was deemed superior to the that of the U.S. and Japan but technical performance, as measured by patents, was deemed inferior. Half a decade later, the European Council of Ministers proudly stated in Lisbon that they had reached a clearly identifiable measurable strategic objective. By this decade’s end, Europe is “to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (Fontaine, 2000, p. 5). Note: DAE=Developing Asian Economies; BERD=Business Enterprise Expenditure on R&D Figure 1: First European Report on Science & Technology Indicators (European Commission, 1994) For the past five years, very influential and powerful European Commission mechanisms, supported by national policies and directives, have driven wave after wave of initiatives, pushing research and enterprise with the aim of overtaking Europe’s main trading partners in terms of effectively commercializing new knowledge. The European Commission’s Enterprise and Industry Directorate has closely measured Europe’s activity in this area, with its latest release in January 2005 of information on EU member country performance as compared to that of the other main trading blocks (European Commission, 2005a). Figure 2, in summarizing recent performance, shows that European performance has not been as good as might be expected. The recent review by The World Economic Forum concludes: “the EU as a whole receives lower scores than the US in seven out of eight Lisbon dimensions” (Blanke & Lopez-Carlos, 2004, p. 14). This has led to open acknowledgment by the highest levels of the Commission that the gap is actually widening. Jose Manuel Barroso, the EU President, bluntly states, “the EU is falling behind on its Lisbon objective of making Europe the most competitive economy in the world” (Barroso, 2005). Propensity of the EU, U.S., Japan and the DAE to produce results a. Scientific performance (number of publications b. Technological performance (number of per million ecus, at 1987 U.S. prices, non-BERD) patents per million ecus, at 1987 U.S. prices, BERD)

BackgroundThe study investigates oscillatory brain activity during working memory (WM) tasks. The tasks employed varied in two dimensions. First, they differed in complexity from average to highly demanding. Second, we used two types of tasks, which required either only retention of stimulus set or retention and manipulation of the content. We expected to reveal EEG correlates of temporary storage and central executive components of WM and to assess their contribution to individual differences.ResultsGenerally, as compared with the retention condition, manipulation of stimuli in WM was associated with distributed suppression of alpha1 activity and with the increase of the midline theta activity. Load and task dependent decrement of beta1 power was found during task performance. Beta2 power increased with the increasing WM load and did not significantly depend on the type of the task. At the level of individual differences, we found that the high performance (HP) group was characterized by higher alpha rhythm power. The HP group demonstrated task-related increment of theta power in the left anterior area and a gradual increase of theta power at midline area. In contrast, the low performance (LP) group exhibited a drop of theta power in the most challenging condition. HP group was also characterized by stronger desynchronization of beta1 rhythm over the left posterior area in the manipulation condition. In this condition, beta2 power increased in the HP group over anterior areas, but in the LP group over posterior areas.ConclusionsWM performance is accompanied by changes in EEG in a broad frequency range from theta to higher beta bands. The most pronounced differences in oscillatory activity between individuals with high and low WM performance can be observed in the most challenging WM task.

In this study, we investigated the relationship between individuals' performance and their heart rate (HR) in a simulation-based training task. Participants were required to monitor a set of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) simulated on a computer monitor, observe fuel levels and refuel within a defined time window. The task was cognitively demanding as it required individuals to be highly attentive. Participants took part in ten trials while their eye-gaze, HR and galvanic skin response were acquired simultaneously. Based on the retention of task performance in later trials, participants were categorised into two groups, a high performance (HP) group and low performance (LP) group. We found that the HP group showed a higher HR compared to the LP group while performing the task, with a difference of around 7 beats per minute. This finding was verified by participants' responses to a post experiment feedback questionnaires. HP participants with higher HR reported better cognitive engagement compared to the LP participants. The LP group reported higher task difficulty compared to the HP group, which might have caused them to exert low effort leading to less engagement. This was reflected in their lower HR and performance scores, compared to the HP group. A regression analysis between performance scores and HR also indicated that HR could be used as a predictor of performance between individuals with high task engagement.