Abstract
Interpretive argumentation is saddled with uncertainty. The predicament is brought about by the presence of competing theories concerning the very notions of legal interpretation and general written-law norms. The paper describes and compares two theories: the frames of interpretations theory and the container-retrieval theory (in its conventional linguistic meaning variety). By means of a critical survey, the frames of interpretations theory will be defended as being both immune from a pretended capital flaw (the impossibility of tracing a clear-cut distinction between explicit and implicit norms), and preferable as a theory of written norms, interpretation, and argumentation, on the three counts of conformity to juristic commonsense, ideological neutrality, and conceptual adequacy.
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