Fragmentation and Cooperation in the Jihadi International (Sub)System: ‘Islamic State’ vs. Al-Qaeda and Beyond

Marina Eleftheriadou

doi:10.3390/rel11040168

Abstract

The article explores the implications the rise of the ‘Islamic State’ (IS) had on the international order and the salafi-jihadi movement. The main argument is that at the height of its activity (2014–2016) IS was a de facto revolutionary state. In this capacity, IS challenged the international order because contrary to revolutionary states in the past it negated the foundations of the Westphalian system. At the same time, the rise of IS had a tremendous impact on the jihadi (sub)system, as it initiated a period of fragmentation and alliance-building. The competition between IS and al-Qaeda for the hegemony of the movement did not revolve around direct fighting as much as efforts to outbid the rival group. One of the main conduits of this competition was the ‘war of bay’as (pledges of allegiance)’, which consisted of competitive oaths of allegiance from local jihadi forces to one of the two groups. In local contexts, the ‘war of bay’as’ increased tensions and factionalism within jihadi groups, as splinter groups decided to side with the new revolutionary foco. The fragmentation of local jihadi groups unfolded along pre-existing cleavages, grievances and resource-related motivations, increasing the levels of violence and complexity in these local conflicts.

Highlights

In July 2014, the entire world watched in shock and disbelief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declare the restoration of the ‘Caliphate’
For years the common wisdom was that the jihadi movement had undergone an organizational transformation in the wake of the ‘war on terrorism’, evolving from a relatively hierarchical group to a deterritorialized network that preferred attacking the West than controlling territory
Many felt the need to situate themselves on the new jihadi map, either reiterating their loyalty to al-Qaeda or siding with the new-comer. This resulted in a flurry of competitive pledges of oath coming from all the corners of the jihadi movement

Summary

Introduction

In July 2014, the entire world watched in shock and disbelief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declare the restoration of the ‘Caliphate’. Given their rarity but high impact, there are two overriding questions: what makes non-state alliances so hard in the first place and what motivations make groups overcome these obstacles and forge alliances against ‘common sense’. On the contrary, Bapat and Bond (2012) claim that weak groups might seek alliances but their inability to withstand counterterrorism pressure turns them into undesirable partners In this turmoil of competing arguments, ideology-based studies pose a simple counter-argument: groups ally (or fragment) for ideological reasons. Often lacking the capacity to reach these global communities, religious groups choose to forge alliances with local same-minded forces International alliances of this kind are possible because the two parties do not ‘compete in the same primary political and resource market’(Bacon 2014) and they have fewer things to worry about

The ‘Caliphate’ Enters the Westphalian Order

Fratricide in the Jihadi Sub-System

Conclusions