Abstract
This paper examines the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium payoffs in discounted supergames with perfect monitoring. It is shown that the equilibrium payoffs can be identified as sub-self-affine sets or graph-directed iterated function systems. We propose a method to estimate the Hausdorff dimension of the equilibrium payoffs and relate it to the equilibrium paths and their graph presentation.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
