Abstract

AbstractAfter a basic review of the contemporary debate about phenomenal consciousness, four puzzles about emotional experience are discussed. First, emotions appear to be essentially motivational states, making them poor candidates for arguments, akin to inverted spectra or zombie worlds. Second, emotions differ significantly in their character, whereas some phenomenal experiences do not. Third, emotions vary significantly in their intensity, another feature lacking in some phenomenal experiences. Fourth, representations do not appear to be the best explanation for the features of emotional experience.

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