Four Distinctions Concerning Rationality

Abstract

Abstract Disagreements about the plausibility of rationalist autonomy in bioethics are often attributable to misunderstandings about the nature of rationality. So, it is imperative to be clear about the understanding of rationality that one is invoking in one’s account of autonomy. This chapter makes some first steps in this regard, by drawing four key distinctions concerning the nature of rationality. The first, between theoretical and practical rationality, concerns the different norms of rationality governing beliefs and desires. The second, between real and apparent reasons, concerns whether our beliefs about our practical reasons map onto reason-giving facts that actually obtain. The third, between objectivism and subjectivism, concerns the fundamental source of our practical reasons. The fourth, between personal and impersonal reasons, concerns the different kinds of facts that can ground practical reasons. In outlining these distinctions, the author follows Derek Parfit in endorsing an objectivist account of reasons.