Four-Dimensional Graded Consciousness.

Jakub Jonkisz,Marek Binder,Michał Wierzchoń

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00420

Abstract

Both the multidimensional phenomenon and the polysemous notion of consciousness continue to prove resistant to consistent measurement and unambiguous definition. This is hardly surprising, given that there is no agreement even as regards the most fundamental issues they involve. One of the basic disagreements present in the continuing debate about consciousness pertains to its gradational nature. The general aim of this article is to show how consciousness might be graded and multidimensional at the same time. We therefore focus on the question of what it is, exactly, that is or could be graded in cases of consciousness, and how we can measure it. Ultimately, four different gradable aspects of consciousness will be described: quality, abstractness, complexity and usefulness, which belong to four different dimensions, these being understood, respectively, as phenomenal, semantic, physiological, and functional. Consequently, consciousness may be said to vary with respect to phenomenal quality, semantic abstraction, physiological complexity, and functional usefulness. It is hoped that such a four-dimensional approach will help to clarify and justify claims about the hierarchical nature of consciousness. The approach also proves explanatorily advantageous, as it enables us not only to draw attention to certain new and important differences in respect of subjective measures of awareness and to justify how a given creature may be ranked higher in one dimension of consciousness and lower in terms of another, but also allows for innovative explanations of a variety of well-known phenomena (amongst these, the interpretations of blindsight and locked-in syndrome will be briefly outlined here). Moreover, a 4D framework makes possible many predictions and hypotheses that may be experimentally tested (We point out a few such possibilities pertaining to interdimensional dependencies).

Highlights

Complex as it is, the phenomenon of consciousness is hard to either measure (Seth et al, 2008; Overgaard et al, 2010; Sandberg et al, 2010; Szczepanowski et al, 2013; Wierzchonet al., 2014) or define properly (Pareira and Ricke, 2009; Velmans, 2009; Jonkisz, 2015)
The range of consciousness varies with respect to biological mechanisms: that is to say, it is most often correlated with a widespread neuronal activation in higher thalamocortical structures (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Baars et al, 2013), yet more localized, lower-level activities are sometimes deemed responsible for consciousness
The question of just how low we should look, in searching for the most basic forms and mechanisms of consciousness, is apposite when adopting, as we do here, a gradational approach to the phenomenon, as it may lead to some counterintuitive consequences, such as ascribing certain levels of consciousness to all organisms or even to primitive artificial systems

Summary

Introduction

The phenomenon of consciousness is hard to either measure (Seth et al, 2008; Overgaard et al, 2010; Sandberg et al, 2010; Szczepanowski et al, 2013; Wierzchonet al., 2014) or define properly (Pareira and Ricke, 2009; Velmans, 2009; Jonkisz, 2015). It is sometimes described in rough terms as ‘all that we experience when not in a dreamless sleep or coma’ (see Searle, 2000). The question of just how low we should look, in searching for the most basic forms and mechanisms of consciousness, is apposite when adopting, as we do here, a gradational approach to the phenomenon, as it may lead to some counterintuitive consequences, such as ascribing certain levels of consciousness to all organisms or even to primitive artificial systems (see Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2010; Koch, 2012; Jonkisz, 2015)

Objectives

Discussion

Conclusion