Four Arguments Against Compromising Justice Internally

Abstract

ÐThis article examines whether legal compromise on matters of justice amounts to a desirable response to the problem raised by reasonable pluralism in politics. Attitudes toward compromise are ambiguous: it is generally seen as much as a valuable technique for settling conflicts by mutual accommodation as a prejudicial concession of one's integrity. The article aims to resolve this paradox by distinguishing cases where compromises of principle cannot be tolerated from those in which they can be. By developing Ronald Dworkin's distinction between internal and external compromises, the article shows that an internal compromise, that combines different conceptions of the same principle or of incommensurable and non-distinct principles, constitutes at the most a second-best alternative. Such a compromise fails to capture the core of our sense of law's intelligibility, justice, correct concept attribution and, finally, political integrity. By contrast, it is argued, external compromises of principle can be tolerated and may even be desirable in some cases. In fact, many conceptions of external compromise regard democracy as a paradigm of political compromise. This view is assessed at the end of the article and it is suggested that democratic procedures can be understood as compromises qua process: they select one of the conflicting views held during deliberation, rather than necessarily combining them into an externally compromised outcome.