Year-end Sale % OFF 
Abstract
This study draws on agency and stewardship theory to evaluate the relationship between alternative governance regimes (founder versus non-founder CEO) adopted at the time of going public on post-IPO economic outcomes in the market for corporate control. We find that the presence of founder CEOs reduces the likelihood of post-IPO change of control but enhances target IPO firm wealth by increasing acquisition premiums. Additionally, we examine whether measures of CEO power over the board moderate the relationship between founder management and target IPO firm wealth. Our results suggest that CEO duality is the most effective instrument of CEO power available to founder CEOs to positively influence target firm wealth. Further, we find that while founder CEOs utilize power derived from CEO duality to increase acquisition premiums, non-founder CEOs use board leadership power to expropriate shareholder wealth.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
