Abstract
Formally, the orthodox rational agent's “Olympian” choices, as Simon has called orthodox rational choice, are made in a static framework. However, a formalization of consistent choice, underpinned by computability, suggests by, satisficing in a boundedly rational framework is not only more general than the model of “Olympian” rationality, it is also consistently dynamic. This kind of naturally process-oriented approach to the formalization of consistent choice can be interpreted and encapsulated within the framework of decision problems—in the formal sense of metamathematics and mathematical logic—which, in turn, is the natural way of formalizing the notion of Human Problem Solving in the Newell-Simon sense.
Highlights
In the tradition of Simon, I start from orthodox underpinnings of rational choice theory and extract its inherent procedural content, which is usually submerged in the inappropriate mathematics of standard real analysis
“In your opening chapter, you are very generous in crediting me with a major role in the attention of the economics profession to the need to introduce limits on human knowledge and computational ability into their models of rationality . . . But you seem to think that little has happened beyond the issuance of a manifesto, in the best tradition of a Mexican revolution”
To give a rigorous mathematical foundation for bounded rationality and satisficing, as decision problems, it is necessary to underpin them in a dynamic model of choice in a computable framework
Summary
No one person better combined and encapsulated, in an intrinsically dynamic, decision-theoretic framework, a computationally founded 2 system of choice and decision, both entirely rational in a broad sense, than Herbert Simon. The aim is to reformulate, with textual support from Herbert Simon’s characterizations and suggestions, bounded rationality and satisficing in a computable framework so that their intrinsic complex dynamics is made explicit in as straightforward a way as possible To achieve this aim, in the tradition of Simon, I start from orthodox underpinnings of rational choice theory and extract its inherent procedural content, which is usually submerged in the inappropriate mathematics of standard real analysis. Not even this fantastic assumption is explicitly made “in economics” unless it is of the Simonian variety of behavioural economics This is why it is important to be aware that, in computational complexity theory, the characterizing framework is one of problem solving, with a model of computation explicitly underpinning it, as decision problem. I will adhere to this tradition, but—at least for my results and propositions—this is only for convenience; I believe that all my formal results can be derived without assuming the Church-Turing Thesis, within the formalism of constructive mathematics
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
