Foundations of a Theory of Multicultural Justice

Abstract

In his new book Multicultural Citizenship, Will Kymlicka extends and reinterprets his case – first made in Liberalism, Community, and Culture – for the recognition of specific rights of cultural minorities on the basis of liberal principles. He convincingly argues that we need to find arguments for cultural rights within the framework of a “comprehensive theory of justice in a multicultural state” (6) and he provides the foundations as well as a discussion of the political practice and application of such a theory. More specifically, in the course of his argument he suggests a number of important distinctions between different cultural groups (national vs. ethnic) and the grounds for their different claims to recognition, the corresponding rights they can claim (self-government, “polyethnic,” special representation), and the limits of these claims (external protection vs. internal restriction). These distinctions and the use Kymlicka makes of them are very illuminating and take the complex debate concerning the meaning of multicultural citizenship a decisive step further. In my remarks on Kymlicka’s impressive enterprise, I want to focus on the question of whether the normative basis from which he proceeds is adequate for his attempt to provide a conception of justice for a multicultural society. It seems to me that the notion of personal autonomy which is the cornerstone of his distinctively liberal approach creates problems and internal tensions in his argument. Starting from this question, one can, I think, also shed some light on more specific points in Kymlicka’s theory, such as his conception of toleration and his view of political integration. Let me begin by briefly indicating what I take to be the main normative characteristics of a conception of justice appropriate for a multicultural society. Obviously, such a conception should provide grounds from which to judge which claims to recognition, raised as claims to certain rights and resources, are justifiable among citizens of a multicultural state. Accordingly, the grounds on which this is to be decided have to be “not reasonable to reject” by the different cultural (ethnic or national) groups involved. The basic values and norms of such a multicultural “basic structure” – and the reasons for important political decisions – have to be equally acceptable to all citizens; thus no cultural group may simply generalize its own values and self-understandings and impose them on others. This does not mean that either the basic structure or the political language in general can be culturally “neutral” as a kind of moral Esperanto; rather, it means