Foundation Theory and Its Alternatives: A Critical Discussion

Abstract

Abstract The foundation-theoretic programme of epistemology came increasingly under attack through the developments of philosophical (post)modernity following the Enlightenment era. The major challenge for foundation theory is finding a means to stop the justificational regress that results from the supposed necessity to base each justification on premises that are themselves in need of justification. Two dimensions of this problem are distinguished: the problem of first-order justification consists in finding immediately evident basic beliefs to which all other beliefs can be traced by means of deductive, inductive, and abductive inferences, a task that is undertaken in Chapters 3 and 4 of the book. The problem of higher-order justification consists in justifying the inference patterns of deduction, induction, and abduction; this enterprise is pursued in Chapters 5–10. Contemporary epistemologists have developed alternative epistemologies such as coherentism, externalism, and commonsensism (or dogmatism). A renewal of foundation theory has to demonstrate its superiority within the intellectual landscape of alternative epistemologies. This task is undertaken in Chapter 2. Coherentism leads to epistemological relativism because it allows for circular justifications that make it possible to justify opposite beliefs. Externalism gives up the attempt of justifying the reliability of our sources of knowledge, thereby depriving itself of meliorative applications. Commonsensism and dogmatism assume non-evident principles as given, thereby being susceptible of relapsing to pre-enlightenment forms of belief stabilization based on authority and power.