Abstract

Overconfidence has long been considered a cause of war. Like other decision-making biases, overconfidence seems detrimental because it increases the frequency and costs of fighting. However, evolutionary biologists have proposed that overconfidence may also confer adaptive advantages: increasing ambition, resolve, persistence, bluffing opponents, and winning net payoffs from risky opportunities despite occasional failures. We report the results of an agent-based model of inter-state conflict, which allows us to evaluate the performance of different strategies in competition with each other. Counter-intuitively, we find that overconfident states predominate in the population at the expense of unbiased or underconfident states. Overconfident states win because: (1) they are more likely to accumulate resources from frequent attempts at conquest; (2) they are more likely to gang up on weak states, forcing victims to split their defences; and (3) when the decision threshold for attacking requires an overwhelming asymmetry of power, unbiased and underconfident states shirk many conflicts they are actually likely to win. These “adaptive advantages” of overconfidence may, via selection effects, learning, or evolved psychology, have spread and become entrenched among modern states, organizations and decision-makers. This would help to explain the frequent association of overconfidence and war, even if it no longer brings benefits today.

Highlights

  • War is deemed a puzzle because if states were rational, they could avoid the costs of fighting in a pre-war bargain that reflected their relative power [1]

  • agent-based models (ABMs) are useful because they allow us to compare the performance of overconfident states in competition with unbiased and underconfident states in a simulated spatial environment

  • Overconfident states—and their associated high levels of a—are more likely to be represented among the states that survive than are unbiased or underconfident states

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Summary

Introduction

War is deemed a puzzle because if states were rational, they could avoid the costs of fighting in a pre-war bargain that reflected their relative power [1]. The phenomenon of overconfidence is a standard result within the psychological literature, which finds that most normal people tend to exhibit cognitive and motivational biases exaggerating their capabilities, their illusion of control over events, and their perceived invulnerability to risk, collectively termed ‘‘positive illusions’’ [17,18] If anything, such individual level biases appear to be further exacerbated at the group, organizational and state levels [6,19,20,21], and historical analyses suggest that states and organizations frequently fail to update their behaviour given past failures [22,23,24]. Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman recently concluded that, of all the psychological biases he and his colleagues have uncovered over the last 40 years of the ‘‘cognitive revolution’’, all of them promote hawkish decision-making [25]

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