Abstract
After the annexation of Crimea, Moscow’s relationship to the western world deteriorated dramatically. This was also true for the bilateral relationship between Russia and Norway. In this article, Norwegian perceptions of its eastern neighbor are discussed. Though clearly biased against Moscow, Norwegian politicians were simultaneously adamant in their emphasis on good neighborly relations with Russia and a will to protect areas of collaboration from spillover effects. This duality, it is argued, reflects a long-standing tradition in Norwegian Russia policies of balancing opposing elements. Though Norwegian media and policy makers were predominantly willing to perform this balancing act, the article also points to examples of unsubstantiated allegations made against “Russia” or “Russian actors”. Originating from marginal outlets, such stories were accommodated by Norwegian mainstream media, which thereby contributed to creating a skewed – or at the very least uncorroborated – image of Russian intentions. From January 2017 onwards, the Russian embassy in Oslo engaged in the public debate. The embassy’s contributions were unusual, more by virtue of their undiplomatic tone than by their political content. Despite current tensions, the author argues that the Norwegian-Russian bilateral relationship is now closer to a historical norm than at any point since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Highlights
Sense and Sensibility: Norway and Russia after Crimea After the annexation of Crimea, Moscow’s relationship to the western world deteriorated dramatically.This was true for the bilateral relationship between Russia and Norway
Bindet bærer tittelen Naboer i frykt og forventning
Norge og Russland 1917-2014 (Holtsmark 2015), en tittel som er delvis identisk med en utgivelse fra 1996, nemlig Frykt og forventning
Summary
Som antydet inntok norske politikere umiddelbart en fordømmende holdning overfor Russland etter folkerettsbruddet på Krimhalvøya. Forsvarsminister Ine Marie Eriksen Søreide og utenriksminister Børge Brende har vært konsistente i sine uttalelser om Russland etter at Ukraina-konflikten oppsto. Samtidig som Regjeringen har uttrykt entydig fordømmelse av russiske handlinger i Ukraina, har den vært påpasselig med å understreke samarbeidspotensialet i det bilaterale forholdet. I korte trekk dreide dette seg om en linje der norsk sikkerhet ble ivaretatt av Natos avskrekkende forpliktelser overfor Norge, samtidig som norske myndigheter begrenset alliert aktivitet på eget territorium i den hensikt å berolige den sovjetiske naboen (Eriksen & Pharo 1997: 85ff). Sammen med Norges eventuelle deltakelse i Natos missilforsvar, er det usikkerhet omkring norsk basepolitikk som har vekket sterkest reaksjoner på russisk side: Er Norge i ferd med å forlate sine «selvpålagte restriksjoner» i nord, som siden 1949 har fungert som et beroligende middel overfor naboen i øst, spør man seg i den russiske utenrikstjenesten (Den russiske ambassaden 2017). Det er derfor for tidlig å konkludere med at konsensustiden i norsk utenrikspolitikk er forbi, selv om dagens labilitet i internasjonale forbindelser skaper uro og usikkerhet også i Norge
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