Forms, Types, and Tokens in Aristotle's Metaphysics

Abstract

ARE ARISTOTELIAN FORMS universals or par t iculars? This ques t ion has received much a t ten t ion in recent discussions. ~ Besides being interes t ing in its own right, the answer is crucial to the in terpre ta t ion of the central books of the Metaphysics, given the interrelatedness of Aris tot le 's not ions of form, subs tance , essence, and definition. If, for example, the correct answer is that forms are universals , Aristotle may be in difficulty, for he denies that universals are substances, and he identifies substance with form. 2 Thus, Aristotle seems to hold that (1) no universal is a substance and that (2) some universals (i.e., forms) are substances. If such a cont rad ic t ion is at the heart of his theory of substance, it would seem to be in t rouble . If we seek to avoid this difficulty by mak ing forms individuals as Edwin H a r t m a n does in a recent paper, ~ we also end up with conflicting doctrines: a th ing ' s subs tance or form is identical with its essence, the formula of which is its de f in i t ion . ' If forms are part iculars, then the objects of defini t ion would be part iculars , but Aris tot le insists that definit ion is of the universal . ~ What is needed, then, is an in terpre ta t ion of forms that allows them to be the objects of knowledge and defini t ion (i.e., universals) and at the same time avoids the cont radic t ion ment ioned above. My proposal is to dis t inguish between substance types and other universals, which I shall call universalsp, and to identify forms with substance types. The cont rad ic t ion we generated above from the thesis that forms are universals is resolved because 1 asserts that no universalp is a substance, and 2 asserts that forms are substance types. The object of this paper is to show that this is Aris tot le 's posi t ion and that consequent ly his theory of forms is much more coherent and philosophical ly satisfying than is frequently realized. Final ly, I hope to show