Formalizing heuristics in decision-making: a quantum probability perspective.

Emmanuel M Pothos,Jerome R Busemeyer

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00289

Emmanuel M Pothos, Jerome R Busemeyer

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00289

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Abstract

One of the most influential research programs in psychology is that of Tversky and Kahneman's (1973, 1983) on heuristics and biases in decision-making. Two characteristics of this program are, first, compelling empirical demonstrations that in some decision-making situations naive observers violate the rules of classic probability (CP) theory and, second, that corresponding behavior can be explained with simple heuristics. Tversky and Kahneman's work has led to a vast literature on what is the basis for psychological process in decision-making. Note that their work, however impactful, has not settled the debate of whether CP theory is suitable for modeling cognition or not. CP models have attracted enormous interest and they often do provide excellent coverage of cognitive processes (e.g., Oaksford and Chater, 2007; Griffiths et al., 2010; Tenenbaum et al., 2011).

Highlights

According to the representativeness heuristic, judgments of frequency are driven by similarity and according to the availability heuristic by the ease of identifying related instances in memory
Tversky and Kahneman’s approach has been to motivate explanations based on heuristics by providing compelling demonstrations for violations of the standard approaches
Postulating the relevance of the representativeness heuristic does not necessitate the relevance of the availability heuristic (Pothos and Busemeyer, 2009a)

Summary

Introduction

Tversky and Kahneman’s approach has been to motivate explanations based on heuristics by providing compelling demonstrations for violations of the standard approaches (in decision-making, CP theory). Results violate CP theory, as most participants consider the statement “Linda is a bank teller and a feminist” as the more probable one (this is called the conjunction fallacy). Tversky and Kahneman’s explanation was that cognitive process is not based on CP theory, rather, participants employ a representativeness heuristic.

Results

Conclusion