Formal versus informal institutions: Extraction and earnings in framed field experiments with small-scale fishing communities in Turkey

Abstract

Although many formal and informal mechanisms have been proposed to avoid over-fishing, their relative effectiveness is relatively understudied. This paper investigates fisher behaviour subject to formal and informal institutions in an experimental field setting. Framed field experiments were conducted with 240 fishers to assess cooperation and compare the effectiveness of formal and informal institutions for small-scale fishers in Turkey. Turkish fisheries is characterized mainly as open-access, subject to immense competition between industrial, small-scale and recreational fishers, even though formal measures such as closed seasons and areas are prevalent. Extraction and earnings were measured under two formal institutions (monetary penalty versus purchase of fishing rights for every unit of catch beyond the quota) and were compared to an informal mechanism involving communication as well as a baseline representing open-access. While monetary penalty was effective to reduce extraction relative to baseline (open-access), the other formal institution, purchase of fishing rights, did not significantly reduce extraction, even though providing the same level of economic incentive. Communication was the most effective to increase earnings and improve income equality. This result supports the argument that community-based institutions and co-management in fisheries management (entailing communication) can improve sustainable resource use and livelihoods of small-scale fishers in developing countries. The results suggest that differently framed economic incentives may lead to differential outcomes in terms of cooperation, earnings and income distribution. These findings contribute to fisheries management in addressing unintended fisher behaviour, as well as to other sustainability policies in dealing with resource use conflicts in general.