Abstract
This paper demonstrates the formal validation process of safety properties of Selective ACKnowledgment (SACK) protocol. SACK is a complex communication protocol as it is used in various types of distributed computer systems and networks. This acknowledgment mechanism is used with sliding window protocol that allows the receiver to acknowledge packets received out of order, but within the correct sliding window. One of the critical property of SACK is its' safety property. In order to validate this property formally by using the Z/Eves theorem prover, we specify the SACK protocol using Z formal specification language. By using theorem prover tool, it helps to reduce time, energy and mistake than in relatively manual theorem proving which can be tedious and error-prone task.
Highlights
Low-level and repetitious, and often results in large proofs - in short it is unsuitable for human checking
Safety property of stream ACKnowledgment (SACK) sender protocol: In 2002, Smith and Ramakrishnan[10] have developed a formal specification of Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) SACK by using I/O automaton model
Based on the I/O automaton model by Smith and Ramakrishnan, we develop a formal specification of SACK by using a Z specification language
Summary
Low-level and repetitious, and often results in large proofs - in short it is unsuitable for human checking. 6. internal operation that causes a state of a data segment in retransmission buffer to be set to not yet received by the receiver. Safety property of SACK sender protocol: In 2002, Smith and Ramakrishnan[10] have developed a formal specification of TCP SACK by using I/O automaton model. A number of theorems are developed based on the related operations and are proved by using Z/Eves theorem prover.
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