Formal power in informal networks. Distribution of power resources in personalized bureaucracies: the case of Russia’s subnational elites

Abstract

ABSTRACT The instrumental use of patronage for political appointments and career advancement can be found across all regime types and historical periods. Despite a pronounced academic interest in the political and economic effects of patron-client relationships, little is known about the nature of interplay between informal networks and formal hierarchies. How are formal powers distributed in personalized bureaucracies? The article addresses this question through a cross-temporal case study of subnational government in one of Russia’s regions – Sverdlovsk Oblast. Based on network analysis and negative binomial regression, the article shows that subnational leaders and their clienteles seek to monopolize those formal powers that allow administrative control over other executive agencies, while other coercive, financial, and normative powers are distributed relatively evenly. This pattern persists regardless of institutional context, degree of subnational autonomy, or the shape of informal networks, which signifies the importance of controlling functions that the core of informal networks in personalized bureaucracies performs.