Formal modeling of human reasoning: errors, limitations and Baconian bees

Abstract

Since the end of the XX century we are witnessing a practical, or cognitive, turn in logic. Drawing on enormous achievements brought about by the mathematical turn that started more than a hundred years ago, logic now has came back to its Artistotelian roots as an instrument by which we come to know anything. The re-forged alliance between logic – now well equipped with sophisticated formal tools – and psychology results in more and more substantial developments in studies on human reasoning and problem solving. To reap the fruits of this alliance we need to be aware that it leads to a shift in focal points of interest of such studies as well as to expansion of their methodological repertoire. In this paper I argue that the practical turn in logic results in: (1) the concept of error becoming crucial for formal modeling of human reasoning processes, (2) prescriptive perspective, which takes into account human limitations in information processing, becoming the most interesting vantage point for such research and (3) triangulation of formal methods, quantitative approach and qualitative analyses becoming most effective methodology in formal modeling studies.