Formal Causes

Abstract

The principal historical thesis of this study is that Aristotle's praise of the historical Socrates for “being the first to pursue universal definitions” is explainable in part by his own attraction to the “formal cause”(or definition-based) mode of explanation in providing justifications for scientific knowledge. First the motives behind Socrates' search for definitions of the ethical virtues are explored, and it is then argued that Aristotle's commitment to the centrality of formal cause explanation in the theory of demonstration he presents in his Posterior Analytics is at odds with his independent recognition at some level that natural phenomena are best explained by reference to efficient causes. It is further argued that this tension is ultimately resolved in his later scientific works, when he abandons this commitment and instead evinces a marked preference for explanation of natural phenomena in terms of efficient as well as so-called final (teleological) causes. The tension between formal and efficient cause explanations is especially evident in Aristotle's discussions of events such as thunder and eclipses in Posterior Analytics B 8–10. The penultimate chapter presents a novel interpretation of Aristotle's manner of treating these phenomena that depends on his fourfold classification of scientific questions and the presupposition relations he believes to hold among them. The final chapter focuses on the role of definition in Aristotle's mature ontology. It is argued there that Metaphysics Z 17 contains a treatment of kinds of composite substances quite parallel to that of thunder and eclipses in the Posterior Analytics, and that this treatment is a crucial element in Aristotle's sustained argument throughout Metaphysics Z and H that such kinds are definable unities.