Abstract
This paper describes and formally analyses two communication protocols that manage the secure emission of digital certificates. The formal analysis is carried out by means of a software tool for the automatic verification of cryptographic protocols with finite behaviour. The tool is able to discover, at a conceptual level, attacks against security procedures. The methodology is general enough to be applied to several kinds of cryptographic procedures and protocols. It is the opinion of the authors that this approach contributes towards a better understanding of the structure and aims of a protocol, for developers, analysers and final users. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.An early version of this paper appeared as ‘Automated analysis of some security mechanisms of SCEP’ by Fabio Martinelli, Marinella Petrocchi and Anna Vaccarelli in Proceedings of the Fifth International Information Security Conference (ISC 2002), (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2433), pp. 414–427 [1], Copyright © 2002 Springer-Verlag. This revised and extended version appears here with the permission of Springer-Verlag
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