Forgiveness and Ideals

Abstract

In my opinion some of the philosophical discussions on the nature of forgiveness confuse the role of the ideal in language, in thought and even in behaviour.' Some philosophers believe they have adequately dealt with the subject of forgiveness once they have carved out an ideal (or model). It is easy to come to this belief particularly if one presumes that saying, 'I forgive you', never alone constitutes forgiveness, and that therefore there must be features of human behaviour, other than speech behaviour, that are essential to the act of forgiving. The view of forgiveness I will defend, on the other hand, takes it for granted that in some instances merely saying, 'I forgive you', does constitute forgiveness. And this is to say that it is a mistake to imagine that there is some specific and definable activity, which activity and no other constitutes forgiveness. Consider, for example, the following sequence of experiences occurring in the lives of two friends, Mary and John: At some time in the past John had offended Mary (unjustifiably), and afterward Mary had said to John, 'Never mind, I forgive you'. Later John finds himself in a difficult situation and turns to Mary for help, but Mary still harbouring ill-will over the earlier offence responds, 'Why should I help you after what you did to me?' John then reminds her, 'But you already forgave me for that', and Mary admits, 'Yes, of course, you're right', and proceeds to help him out. Both Mary and John would be agreeing, so it seems, that Mary had forgiven John (no matter that she still felt ill-will towards him), and that her forgiveness forbade her use of the earlier incident 'against him'. This is an instructive example to consider since philosophers who carve ideals of forgiveness are inclined to insist that the 'wiping away' of all illwill and resentment is a necessary feature of forgiving behaviour. It is true that this feature may be a desirable or ideal feature to be attained in many instances where forgiveness is called for, nevertheless, a variety of activities are embraced under the meaning of 'forgiveness', and not all of these activities, perhaps not most, involve the wiping away of all ill-will and resentment. The expression 'forgiveness' does not designate a characteristic and peculiar activity; the language of forgiveness is quite often put to a performatory use, and it is not always put to the same performatory use. A wife who still feels resentment towards her husband may find it important to forgive him in order to affirm that she wishes their relationship