Foreign Policy as Compensation: Why Brexit Became a Foreign and Security Policy Issue

Abstract

Abstract Exogenous reform demands can put leaders in a tight spot where change runs up against structural impediments. Yet, where asymmetries in reform costs occur across domains, leaders can seek to re-frame the impetus of change from one domain to another. Such compensatory behavior is commonplace but is not adequately captured by existing research on linkage politics, forum shopping, or diversionary conflict. This article develops the concept of compensatory foreign policy, whereby leaders use foreign policy change to compensate for unviable economic reforms when they have greater capacity and choice in the former domain. Empirically, we use elite interviews to reconstruct the politics of security policy in the post-Brexit United Kingdom, showing how party leaders focused on foreign policy change when beneficial economic arrangements were precluded. Our argument contributes to recent research on linkage politics by demonstrating the conditions under which leaders seek foreign policy reforms to compensate for economic weakness.