Abstract
In a two‐period duopoly model, this paper considers a foreign firm’s choice between licensing and FDI and studies the relative impact of these modes of technology transfer on the incentives for innovation of that firm and its domestic rival. Relative to licensing, FDI limits technology spillovers to the domestic firm but dissipates more rents in the product market. Internalization allows the foreign firm to build on an existing technological advantage. While the local firm develops its best technology if initial licensing is followed by FDI, the foreign firm transfers the most efficient technology under FDI in both periods.
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