FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DECISION, TRANSACTION‐COST ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY

Abstract

The end of World War II brought about many economic changes, among them the tremendous increase of US manufacturing activities in Western Europe. This astronomical increase of foreign direct investment (FDI) required a new theory ‐ an economic theory of foreign direct investment. International economic theory, which traditionally had ignored the FDI decision, was not able to explain the FDI decision, nor could it explain the phenomena of multinational corporation (MNC). In a world of perfect competition, foreign direct investment would be absent. And when all markets operate efficiently, when there are no external economies of production and marketing, when information is costless and there are no barriers to trade or competition, international trade is the only possible form of international involvement. Logically, it follows that it is the departures from the models of perfect competition that must provide the rationale for foreign direct investment. Since, according to the Heckscher‐ Ohlin‐Samuelson (neoclassical) model, trade of goods will equalize factor prices in a world of factor immobility. In fact, the FDI decision is even ignored by new international economics which, since the late 1970's, has utilized new developments in the field of industrial organization. Proponents of these new theories have developed models that emphasize increasing returns and imperfect competition and see the possibility that government involvements in trade (trade restrictions, export subsidies, etc.) may under some circumstances be useful. All of this is done while foreign direct investment is ignored.