Abstract
This paper characterizes the optimal path of foreign public debt that can support politically unanimous (Pareto welfare improving) economic growth under uncertainty. The feasibility of the plan depends on whether the maintenance of political consensus in the debtor country requires additional loans that are high relative to the country’s outstanding debt. If a program is feasible, then the creditors will have an incentive to preserve political support for the plan, in case of adverse developments, by offering debt relief. Unlike the certainty case, where only total debt matters, uncertainty makes also the timing of debt repayments critical for economic development.
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