Foreign Aid Disbursement and Recipient Voting Behavior in an International Organization: The Case of Japan and the International Whaling Commission

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between Japanese foreign aid disbursement and recipient state membership and voting in the International Whaling Commission (IWC). Focusing on 104 countries for the period 1994 to 2005, we investigate whether Japan gives higher levels of aid to IWC members that vote with Japan. The effects of the independent variables are estimated with a linear mixed regression model that adjusts for country level random intercepts. Controlling for other possible influences on ODA disbursements, and employing different measures of dyadic voting similarity, the study finds Japanese aid concentrates in members of the IWC that are microstates. The findings of the paper also indicate that microstate members of the IWC who align their votes with Japan are more likely to receive Japanese ODA. By demonstrating that Japan’s strategy is focused on microstates, the study provides a more refined understanding of the mechanisms Japan employs to end the IWC’s moratorium on commercial whaling. Similar to the findings of previous research, we find that Japanese aid responds both to narrow sectoral interests and broader humanitarian goals.