Forceful Persuasion or Half-Hearted Diplomacy?

Abstract

In the first two years of his administration, US President Barack Obama has sought more cooperative relations with Iran and North Korea as a means of halting nuclear proliferation. While the US has backed these efforts with coercive measures such as targeted sanctions, critics contend that these efforts at coercive diplomacy have been weak and ineffective. This debate raises important questions about the conditions and strategies that favour coercive diplomatic success as well as the relationship between coercive means and broader negotiating ends. A chief method of evaluating present efforts at forceful persuasion is interrogate and derive lessons from critical recent cases. The 1998-99 Kosovo crisis is one such case.NATO's involvement the Balkan conflict illustrates the perils of employing coercive diplomatic strategies when the target state is highly motivated and willing incur significant risks. Just as Iran and North Korea regard their nuclear programs as fundamental their national interests, Yugoslavia sought protect its territorial integrity from an unwelcome NATO intervention. The passage of time, furthermore, has allowed a significant amount of information on the Kosovo case enter the public realm, enabling the detailed case study analysis necessitated by the subject.This article will use former Stanford University professor Alexander George's analytical framework as a means of assessing NATO's approach the Kosovo crisis.1 In examining George's criteria that favour coercive diplomatic success, it will demonstrate that the model holds great power for understanding when and how coercive diplomacy can be used most effectively conflict management. The article will provide background on the conflict, including NATO's and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's primary interests the south Serbian province. It will then assess NATO's application of coercive diplomacy three connected, yet distinct, episodes. NATO's first coercive diplomatic effort took place the autumn of 1998 and led a substantial withdrawal of Yugoslav security forces, the creation of the Kosovo verification mission, and a political process. This stage represented a modest success for coercive diplomacy. The second stage, which took place February- March 1999, resulted an unsuccessful mediation and the commencement of a NATO bombing campaign. This phase was a clear failure of coercive diplomacy. The final stage, which took place from April June 1999, was an ambiguous success inasmuch as it led Yugoslavia's acceptance of the terms of United Nations security council resolution 1244, but at considerable human and military cost. The three cases present an opportunity for a relatively systematic comparison because many contextual factors and conditions remained constant through the three stages. The article will conclude by deriving four principal policy lessons from the case and analyzing their implications for understanding coercive diplomacy the present context.THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEWGeorge suggests that coercive diplomacy is employed in hopes of securing a peaceful resolution of a serious dispute by persuading an opponent to stop or undo his effort alter the status quo situation.2 Critics of coercive diplomacy point the limited historical effectiveness of the strategy and suggest that leaders should instead employ decisive force undo or precipitate a rapid end an undesirable action. Proponents of the strategy, such as George, argue that coercive diplomacy offers a valuable, though beguiling, crisis management tool that sometimes fails its implementation.Coercive diplomacy has four variants. The first, labelled the try and see approach, refrains from overt threats while seeking persuade the target state alter its behaviour. The second variant, called the gradually turning the screws approach, is characterized by an incremental intensification of pressure on an adversary. …