Abstract

AbstractThis paper examines the epistemic value of other-regarding epistemic virtues, challenging the common view that these virtues are primarily moral in nature. To this end, it proposes a new framework to explain the role of epistemic virtues: the Epistemic Social Environment (ESE). It is argued that the value of an epistemic virtue stems from its contribution to a healthy ESE. This approach enables a broader and unified theory of epistemic virtues, emphasising their role in the communal production of knowledge. Ultimately, the paper aims to reconcile virtue epistemology with insights from social epistemology, offering a comprehensive account of the epistemic value of sharing knowledge.

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