For an Amoral, Dispositional Account of Weakness of Will

Abstract

The topic of weakness of will (WOW) has attracted a significant amount of philosophical analysis within the last decade or so. 1 But a standard approach is still to analyze WOW as basically some kind of action contrary to one's better judgment (ACBJ, for short). I shall argue that WOW need not involve, and often is not, ACBJ, and thus should not be defined as such conduct. My argument is twofold. First, in §2,1 will argue for WOW without conduct (i.e., merely dispositional WOW). Second, in §3, I will argue against the normative standards in Robert Audi's conception of WOW, and for an amoral conception of WOW. Further, I shall argue that WOW is a particular kind of disposition to fail to act in accord with one's highest order desire (e.g., one's second order desires about first order desires such as hunger and thirst). Our topic, after all, is weakness of wilt. So I want to avoid assuming, as ACBJ does, that WOW fundamentally concerns judgment, which is identified with the intellect as distinct from the will. I want to avoid assuming the conflation of conativc states (which involve desires, dispositions and the will) with cognitive states (which concern beliefs, judgments, and the intellect).