For a political philosophy of parent–child relationships

Abstract

In Family Values, Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift argue that parents should, in sharing values with their children and in conferring advantage upon them, act in ways that realize the intimacy that lies at the core of the value of family life. In their view, they should prescind from autonomy-inhibiting activities not required by the need to maintain intimacy. I argue that while this standard is sufficient to distinguish between permissible and impermissible practices of advantage conferral, it does not provide us with a perspicuous standard with which to distinguish among activities of value-sharing. This is because the difference between permissible and impermissible forms of value-sharing is adverbial rather than categorical. I argue moreover that even if we were to solve this problem, we would end up with another problem, to do with the unattractive nature of the state activities that would have to be set up in order to police family life. I conclude that the problem of how to enforce the child’s right to autonomous upbringing is best thought of as a political one. Schools, rather than the home, are the appropriate site for the development of autonomy, and the state appropriately regulates schools to ensure that they achieve this end.