Abstract
ABSTRACT The present essay concurs with R. Beehler's recent contribution to this journal (‘For One Concept of Liberty’, (1) 1991) in deeming the concept of negative liberty fully adequate for political discourse. Thus, section 1 indicates a plausible line of reasoning by which the negative concept can be defended against some standard objections. However, sections 2 and 3 argue that, nevertheless, Beehler's traditional conception of negative liberty is inadequate. It does not account correctly for various paradigmatic cases of ‘unfreedom’, for instance, the curtailment of the liberty of the poor by their lack of economic resources. More precisely, Beehler's account will in many such cases fail to identify the correct constraining agents. The present essay suggests how Beehler's aim may be achieved on the basis of a different conception of negative liberty: the ‘responsibility view’.
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