Abstract
In this paper we study the player's reasoning in normal form games. To this end we generalize the concept of objective correlated equilibrium distributions introduced by Aumann [1987] to the subjective case. We propose simple and easily interpretable axioms of the rational behavior dealing with these distributions of subjective correlated equilibrium. We then offer a common basis to different usual solution concepts and to the less known concept of strong rationalisability (Stalnaker [1994]).
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
