“Following according to a rule is FUNDAMENTAL to our language-game”. Rules and Meaning in Wittgenstein

Abstract

There is widespread agreement that, in his later philosophy, Wittgenstein sees the meaning of a word as a matter of the rules for its use; to grasp its meaning is to grasp the rules for its use; and using the word with that meaning is a matter of following those rules. Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss have challenged that widely-shared interpretation. They argue that the later Wittgenstein does not think that the meanings of words are determined by rules or that using language involves following rules. And they think that the idea that using a word involves following rules is not just wrong as an interpretation of Wittgenstein; it is philosophically unacceptable in its own right. The paper defends the standard interpretation of Wittgenstein on rules and meaning against Glüer and Wikforss’s arguments. Textual evidence in favour of the standard interpretation is presented. Glüer and Wikforss’s textual case for their interpretation is discussed and found unconvincing. The paper then defends the view that using language involves following rules against Glüer and Wikforss’s philosophical critique. It is argued that Wittgenstein shows us a way to understand language-use as a form of rule-following behaviour that is consistent with his other commitments and maintains the distinction between following a rule and merely acting in accord with a rule. His account is an anti-reductionist one; there is no prospect of giving a non-circular account of what it is to follow a rule. But there is nothing philosophically unsatisfactory about that.