Abstract
This paper characterizes perfect folk theorems for repeated games with overrlapping generations of finite-lived players. We prove two uniform folk theorems that admit arbitrarily long-lived players for a given discount factor; the result for n > 2 players requires a full-dimensional payoff space. Under no assumptions whatsoever, a nonuniform n-player folk theorem obtains in which the discount factor must covary with the players' lifespans. Our focus on the overlap rather than the generation makes possible compact and explicit descriptions of all equilibria. We later synthesize our results in a more general setting with some finite- and some infinite-lived players.
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